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Abstract 
This chapter traces the practice of PR from pre-independence Kenya to the 21st 
century. It emerges that the practice of PR is closely tied to major national events 
and to social, cultural, political and economic forces. PR roles as understood by the 
pre-independence colonial government: keeping the public informed on government 
development projects, assessing public opinion and advising government, endear-
ing government to Kenyans and building the awareness of Kenya abroad have con-
tinued to modern-day Kenya. 
Keywords: colonial, independence, public administration, public information     
Analysis of the history of public relations (PR) in Kenya must be based 
on major historical events that, positively or negatively, shaped the 
country. As will be shown, the status of PR in Kenya is closely tied to 
key events that took place mostly after Kenya attained independence 
from Britain in 1963. Much of this chapter is based on historical docu-
ments obtained from the Kenya National Archives and Documentation 
Service, scholarly articles and interviews with current practitioners. 
Although it will focus on key events that took place from mid-20th 
century, specifically from 1963 onwards, there will be a brief discus-
sion of PR practices during the years before independence. A review of 
key events in Kenya’s history from independence to date, and a subse-
quent discussion of the role that PR played in these events, highlights 
the social, cultural and political forces that helped shape PR practice. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of PR and PR-like activity before 
independence in 1963. 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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PR in pre-independent Kenya 
Kenya became a British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 and was de-
clared a colonial state in 1920 (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995). 
The British colonialists recognized the importance of fostering good 
interpersonal communication and social relations with indigenous 
Kenyans, Indians and Arabs (Mbeke, 2009). Indigenous Kenyan com-
munities practiced PR-like techniques during communal events. Lo-
cal communities had their spokesperson, adviser and master of cere-
mony. Tactics such as song and dance were used to communicate an 
important message or to keep guests entertained during a gathering. 
Songs and dances were used by the Agikuyu, one of the indigenous 
communities in Kenya, to express an emotion or message of goodwill 
towards others. Routledge and Routledge (1910, p. 111) state that “by 
song and dance they give expression to their emotions ... expresses 
general sentiments of amity on behalf of all in a song of high pitch.” 
Boys would fill gourds with small objects to form a rattle that com-
municated a particular message, and “inscribe on the gourd the story 
of their journeyings” (Routledge and Routledge, 1910, p. 112). 
Few dances could have been planned for amusement only. “Dances 
were an essential and significant part of many ceremonies, or, in the 
case of a dance such as the kibaata were organized either to assem-
ble the people to hear some important pronouncement or as a pre-
liminary to a raid on an enemy tribe” (Leakey, 1977, p. 392). The use 
of song and dance to assemble people was similar to a contemporary 
PR/presentation action of employing dancers to entertain guests be-
fore the official start of a ceremony. 
Those appointed to speak at community gatherings were not only 
expected to be intelligent but eloquent. “Intelligence is much prized, 
and so is eloquence,” and upon eating a banana and beetle, a man 
“finds himself gifted with many words everyone hangs on his utter-
ance, his arguments are overwhelming” (Routledge and Routledge, 
1910, p. 206). (A beetle was thought to carry some “power of convic-
tion” and the appointed speaker would insert the beetle in a banana 
and eat it after drying it in the sun.) The requirement by the indig-
enous Agikuyu people of Kenya that a speaker be intelligent and el-
oquent can be compared with some of the characteristics that pres-
ent-day PR practitioners seek when selecting the appropriate speaker 
for an event. 
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Strict guidelines were put in place to deal with an individual or 
group that stole someone else’s cattle. Cattle are still one of the most 
prized possessions particularly among members of the Maasai com-
munity. Wagner (1956, p. 104) discusses how Bantu communities went 
about compensating someone whose cattle had been stolen. “The pay-
ment of cattle in restitution aims primarily at restoring equilibrium 
in the ‘assets’ of the two persons involved. It is, that is to say, a com-
pensation rather than a fine” (ibid., p. 104). Compensation is an ac-
commodative crisis response strategy in modern-day image restora-
tion efforts, and research recommends that it (compensation) be used 
in situations where there is a high attribution of crisis responsibility 
on the organization (Coombs, 2015). 
At the height of the fight for independence in Kenya in the late 
1940S and 1950S, relations between indigenous Kenyan communi-
ties and the colonial British administrators were at an all-time low. 
In 1944, the Kenyan African Union (KAU) was formed to champion 
the struggle for independence. In 1947, Jomo Kenyatta became the 
KAU leader (Furedi, 1989). The campaigners for Kenyan independence 
formed the Mau Mau group in 1952, and in the following year, Ke-
nyatta was jailed for leading the Mau Mau movement. He was released 
from jail in 1959, and in 1961 he assumed the presidency of Kenya. 
In 1963, Kenya attained independence and became a republic in 1964 
with Kenyatta as its first president.  
Cautious not to intrude in local cultures mostly during the pe-
riod when Kenyans started fighting for independence, the British re-
lied on the “indirect rule” policy in which traditional rulers operated 
within an established British framework. The British framework rec-
ognized the importance of “good interpersonal relations ... mainte-
nance of relationships and the importance of communication” be-
tween the British and traditional rulers known as chiefs (L’Etang and 
Muruli, 2004, p. 217). 
The British used PR with a view to building mutual understanding 
between the white settlers and the local people. In a memorandum 
dated 1947, Public Relations Work in the Colonies, the Chief Secretary 
to the colonial government describes PR as “the art of establishing 
and maintaining within a community a spirit of fellowship and co-
operation based on mutual understanding and trust” (Chief Secre-
tary, 1947, p. 1). 
Dane  Kiambi  in  Middle  Eastern and  Afr ican  Perspect ives  … (2014)        4
Assuming the colonial government practiced PR as they defined it, 
it can be deduced that the British civil servants were aware of the im-
portance of PR in helping build relationships with local communities. 
Before venturing into the aims of PR in the colonies, the memo-
randum sought to distinguish between public relations, propaganda 
and publicity. While publicity was a “technique of presenting the ac-
tivities of a government in or business organisation in a favourable 
light,” the memo presented a much broader role for the concept of PR 
since it entailed creating and maintaining relationships among com-
munity members based on mutual understanding (ibid.). 
The aim of PR in the colonies, the memo states, was to “develop 
mutual understanding and trust among all sections of the community 
in each colony ... and to develop a closer association between the peo-
ple of the Colony and the local government, so as to make the peo-
ple accept the Government as “their” Government” (ibid.). The memo 
noted that “a positive public relations policy” was needed to persuade 
the locals to be responsible for their own affairs and to have them ac-
cept that the government was “their” government (ibid.). 
Part of the proposed “positive public relations policy” would in-
clude the granting of a “new constitution, the development of a new 
system of local government and the appointment of local officers to 
senior posts” (ibid.). The proposal to give a new constitution, develop 
the local government and employ local people could be classified as 
proactive PR strategies that the British were using in order to develop 
a closer association with the locals.  
The memo went on to urge senior colonial government officials 
against continued use of “autocratic control” on the local people. In-
stead of applying “autocratic control” techniques, the memo urged 
government officers to “accept and act on the idea of consultation” 
with the people one worked with (ibid.). Such consultation would en-
tail the government officer discussing government plans with the lo-
cal people before the plans are executed. Consulting the public on gov-
ernment initiatives would convince the locals that the responsibility 
for the initiative did not exclusively belong to the government but to 
them (the local people) as well. 
PR, the memo continued, would also play a key role in enabling 
good race relations between white settlers and local people. Breaking 
down racial barriers would require mutual confidence between the 
government and the local people, where the latter “are not merely 
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passive co-operators in or critics of the Government’s policy, but ac-
tive partners taking a positive share in the formation of policy” (ibid.). 
To eradicate racial barriers, PR strategies must be sought and applied 
in order to arouse the interest and initiative of the local people, and 
evoke enthusiasm towards government projects. 
Another key role for PR would be to inform “the government of 
trends in public opinion” (ibid., p. 2). The memo advocated the need 
for the PR officers to have access to police officers and district offi-
cers so as to accurately assess public opinion towards the government. 
Regarding the qualifications of the head of the Public Relations 
Department, the memo stated that “he must have a sympathetic ap-
proach to the public, he must have feelings for the colonial people, 
and he must believe in the future of the Colony” (ibid.). In addition, 
he should be a person of some seniority, “with administrative ability, 
with a flair for publicity, and with a sincere and sympathetic approach 
to his work” (ibid.). Although the PR officer need not concern himself 
with policy formulation, he should be present when important policy 
matters are being discussed. 
The analysis of the memorandum by the Chief Secretary to the co-
lonial government identifies four key roles of PR in the colonial gov-
ernment: to assist the white settlers build mutual understanding and 
relationships with the locals; to persuade the locals to accept the local 
government as theirs; to advise the government on the state of public 
opinion; and to improve race relations with the locals. 
The memorandum also demonstrates that the colonial government 
differentiated between propaganda, publicity and PR. It also empha-
sized that for relations between the locals and the white-dominated 
colonial government to improve, there must be proactive PR such as 
appointing locals to senior government positions, development of a 
new system of local government and a new constitution. The pro-
posal for these three proactive strategies is indicative of the extent to 
which the British colonial officers were convinced that publicity with-
out genuine concrete action by the colonial government would fail. 
The strategy to employ locals to senior government positions was, 
however, a dishonest ploy since the colonial settlers ruled indirectly 
through them. 
A letter from an Acting Information Officer, based at the Kenya In-
formation Office in Nairobi, responding to the memo states that the 
Department of Information had already adopted the proposed policy. 
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(It is not possible to decipher the Officer’s name from his signature on 
archived correspondence.) The officer noted acceptance of PR’s gov-
ernmental definition, the need to build mutual understanding and 
trust among all the communities in the colonies, the need to consult 
the people before executing a policy, and the need to keep the govern-
ment informed of every action taken by the colonial government (Act-
ing Information Officer, 1947). 
The response is notable for positioning PR’s role as “assisting in 
the provision of mechanical services for mass education,” arranging 
“frequent press conferences” which have “an opportunity for full and 
frank discussions” and supporting information distribution and pub-
licity about the colony abroad (ibid., p. 1). The unnamed officer coun-
tered prevailing local governmental views that the head of a PR depart-
ment should be a trained journalist and implicitly agreed with the Chief 
Secretary’s characteristics for the appointment. However, the work of 
information staff was not to break down racial barriers, as proposed 
in the Chief Secretary’s memo (ibid.). It is apparent from this proposal 
and the civil servant’s response that PR was understood as being more 
than information dissemination and publicity. This set the base for PR’s 
future development and implementation in the latter days of colonial 
government and into the independence era in 15 years’ time. 
The next part of this chapter will focus on other major events that 
took place in Kenya after independence in 1963, discuss the role that 
PR played in them and consider whether PR strategies and practices, 
as understood and practiced by the colonial government, were inher-
ited by the incoming nationalist government.  
PR in post-independence Kenya 
Following independence in 1963 and the naming of Jomo Kenyatta as 
first president of Kenya, the country embarked on building the young 
nation. Kenyatta articulated the urgent need to fight what he referred 
to as the three enemies of development: ignorance, poverty and dis-
ease. An analysis of documents from the Kenya National Archives in-
dicates that PR played pivotal roles such as building positive relation-
ships between officials of the new government and the public, shaping 
the image of Kenya locally and abroad and repairing the image and 
reputation of the government following a crisis. 
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Upon the setting up of various government ministries and the ap-
pointment of ministers, top government officials corresponded on gov-
ernance issues. The need for government PR was a topic put forward 
by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism. This is il-
lustrated by contemporary communication between top government 
officials. 
Shortly after independence in 1965, the permanent secretary/ac-
counting officer to the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and 
Tourism requested the senior press officer in the ministry to initiate 
plans to establish the Department of Public Relations in the ministry. 
In response, the senior press officer, P. L. Wangalwa, proposed a de-
partment which, he suggested, was manned by a “well trained officer 
in Public Relations” (1965, p. 1). That the Permanent Secretary asked 
the Press Officer to initiate the department further indicates that gov-
ernment officials differentiated between publicity and PR. 
In a communication to fellow Permanent Secretaries, P. J. Gachathi, 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting 
and Tourism, wrote that, for the new government to maintain its over-
whelming public support, “continuous attention must be paid to pub-
lic relations. It is not enough for our policies to be correct. They must 
be seen to be correct” (1966, p. 1). Implicit in the statement was that 
PR was expected to take the important role of building relationships 
with the public. Gachathi also noted that “just as the financial and se-
curity indications of a line of policy are considered at an early stage 
and borne in mind throughout the operations, so also should the pub-
lic relations side of any government activity be remembered” (ibid.). 
The permanent secretary’s memo, Government Public Relations: 
The Need for Public Relations, also urges government ministries and 
departments to use PR officers to “provide quick and correct answers 
about his ministry’s policies and activities at all hours. He must be 
available for providing immediate information to counter false or mis-
leading reports” (ibid., p. 3). 
Besides using PR to cultivate good relations between the young 
government and the public and managing crises, the government of 
Kenya also relied on it to manage overseas image. A letter from the 
Kenyan Ambassador to Egypt, Ochieng Adala, urged the Ministry of 
Information to provide the embassy with PR material since “the de-
mand for material, and particularly pictorial, on wild life, scenery, 
activities, etc., about Kenya is far too great over here” (1966, p. 1). 
Dane  Kiambi  in  Middle  Eastern and  Afr ican  Perspect ives  … (2014)        8
Building the awareness of Kenya among international publics was, as 
today, an important international PR strategy. 
In 1969, two major events changed Kenya for the worse. On 5 July, 
the charismatic nationalist leader and Minister for Economic Planning 
and Development Tom Mboya was assassinated by an unknown assail-
ant in downtown Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city. The killing of Mboya, 
who hailed from the Luo community, was widely blamed on President 
Kenyatta and his government. The grapevine and the media insinu-
ated that top government officials, mostly from President Kenyatta’s 
Kikuyu community, had murdered Mboya because of his rising popu-
larity and possible interest in the presidency. These allegations have 
never been proven. 
Following Mboya’s assassination, the resentment that had been 
building between members of his Luo community and the president’s 
Kikuyu community became full-blown. Earlier in 1966, Kenya’s first 
vice president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, also a Luo, had resigned from 
Kenyatta’s government following ideological differences with the pres-
ident. Mboya’s death was a catalyst that led most Luos to view them-
selves as threatened by the Kenyatta government. 
Talk of members of different communities, particularly the Ki-
kuyu, gathering secretly at night to take oath and pay their allegiance 
to their community and President Kenyatta surfaced in the media. The 
alleged oath-taking at Kenyatta’s home at Gatundu in central Kenya 
widened the rift between the Kikuyu and Luo communities and was 
a prominent incident that led to the tribalism that continues to exist 
among Kenyan communities. 
Following these two incidents, the government applied PR tech-
niques to minimize their negative impact on government operations 
and image. P. L. Wangalwa, who was promoted from senior press of-
ficer to PR officer in the Ministry of Information, was advising the 
government on its responses. Five days after the Mboya assassina-
tion, Wangalwa wrote to his permanent secretary proposing ways to 
repair the damage on Kenya’s reputation. He warned that “tribalism 
and other ‘isms thrive on confusion and rumour and we must face 
squarely the crisis which the death has brought to Kenya” (Wangalwa, 
1969a, p. 1). He suggested the preparation of a booklet with facts on 
Mboya’s achievements, speeches and pictures which would be distrib-
uted to the public and media locally and abroad. His request was ap-
proved by the permanent secretary. 
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In response to the extensive rumors of oath taking and the emerg-
ing tribalism, Wangalwa proposed that President Kenyatta addressed 
the nation live on television and radio to clear his name over claims 
of oath-taking at his home. To further restore confidence in Kenyatta 
as the president of all Kenyans, Wangalwa proposed that the presi-
dent undertook a “meet-the-people” tour across the country to dis-
pel the rumors and convince fellow citizens that his government had 
their interests at heart. 
In his memo Presidential Public and Press Relations, Wangalwa 
proposed that Kenyatta borrow a strategy from his Tanzanian and 
Ugandan counterparts, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote, respectively, 
and make courtesy calls to the villages. Instead of addressing them, 
he should take questions from the crowd. In addition, he proposed 
that the President visit dissatisfied parts of the country such as those 
in Luo areas and spend “two to three weeks ... and receive disgrun-
tled delegations led by area politicians” (Wangalwa, 1969b, p. 1). He 
claimed this strategy would help quell the anti-Kenyatta rumors. 
In a letter addressed to the Permanent Secretary in the Office of 
the President, Attorney General, all Permanent Secretaries and pro-
vincial commissioners, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of In-
formation noted that the “primary challenge to nationhood existed in 
the tribal, racial and even religious divisions of the society wrested 
from colonialism,” and called for coordinated use of government PR 
machinery to tackle these problems (Gachathi, 1968, p. 1). Exactly 
how the PR departments addressed religious and racial divisions is 
not clear because there were no archives to inspect on this issue. In 
addressing tribal divisions, though. Wangalwa’s strategy for the Pres-
ident to personally lead visits to disgruntled communities was heeded 
and Kenyatta travelled across the country. 
Summarizing the role that PR played in immediate post-indepen-
dent Kenya, it emerges that middle-rank officers in the new govern-
ment were aware of the important roles that it could play in building 
a cohesive country devoid of tribal, religious and racial divisions. The 
analysis also shows that new government ensured each ministry had 
a PR officer. By 1968, five years after independence, virtually all the 
ministries had staff with clearly defined PR roles (ibid.). There was a 
clear understanding of the role of PR vis-a-vis that of the press office. 
PR’s role was to build mutual understanding between the government 
and the people, minimize the damage to government during crises 
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and promote a good image of Kenya abroad. The role of the press of-
fice was to provide publicity to activities being undertaken by gov-
ernment ministers. 
Following Kenyatta’s death in 1978, his Vice President Daniel Arap 
Moi was sworn in as president. Moi went on to rule Kenya for 24 years 
until he left power in 2002 following a constitutionally mandated two-
term limit, a provision introduced in 1992 after the first multiparty 
general election. The next section addresses PR in Kenya during the 
Moi era. It goes on to discuss PR during the periods of the third Pres-
ident Mwai Kibaki and his successor, Uhuru Kenyatta. 
PR in the post-Kenyatta era (1979–now) 
Upon coming to power, Moi promised to follow in the footsteps of his 
predecessor. Moi’s 24 years in power have been described as a period 
when the country had little socio-economic and political progress. 
This was mainly because of the increase in tribalism, nepotism, sti-
fling of political dissent, official corruption and unattractive environ-
ment for businesses (Steeves, 2006). From 1969, Kenya was a de facto 
one-party state until 1982 when the ruling party Kenya African Na-
tional Union (KANU), under Moi, made itself the sole legal party in Ke-
nya. Until the early 1990s, KANU party delegates reappointed Moi as 
president unopposed through acclamation in order to curb opposition 
(Wanyande, 1995). The kind of control witnessed in the political arena 
“extended to organizations within civil society such as mass media, 
women’s organizations and ethnic welfare associations” (ibid., p. 57). 
In 1991, a group of former Moi loyalists-turned-critics formed an 
opposition to agitate for multiparty democracy in the country. With his 
hold on power under threat, Moi responded ruthlessly with the police 
and other government functionaries detaining without trial, assault-
ing, maiming and assassinating his opponents (Ogolla, 2011). One of 
Kenya’s worst corruption scandals was perpetrated in the early 1990s 
when President Moi was facing his first competitive presidential elec-
tion. The country is estimated to have lost billions of shillings of pub-
lic funds which were allegedly used to fund Moi’s presidential cam-
paign (Chege, 2008; Mwangi, 2008). 
Moi’s authoritarian government left little room for anyone holding 
a divergent opinion. To most businesses including the mass media, the 
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state assumed “the right to control and to expect unchallenged obedi-
ence” (Wanyande, 1995, p. 58). Authoritarianism “as it relates to the 
mass media ... lead(s) to distortion of information and in some cases, 
the deliberate disinformation of the public. It also aims at keeping the 
public ignorant” (ibid., p. 59). 
The growth of PR during Moi’s regime was severely limited by 
his government’s obsession with controlling information for the pub-
lic. Alfred Ng’ang’a, a leading PR practitioner, said Moi’s government 
“muzzled public information by channeling all government informa-
tion via the Presidential Press Service (PPS)” (Ng’ang’a, personal com-
munication, 2 June 2014). All dissemination of government news for 
the public was vetted by the PPS and relegated Public Relations Offi-
cers (PROs) in government ministries to the technical roles of gath-
ering and writing news about government initiatives. The important 
role of deciding what would be broadcast or printed was bestowed 
on the head of PPS. “It was not possible for the public information of-
ficers in the ministries ... to decide what would be broadcast. In in-
stitutions like the military, it was unthinkable that there would be a 
spokesperson” (ibid.). 
The need to censor public information had emerged during the 
Kenyatta presidency (Ogolla, 2011). “The formative years of Jomo Ke-
nyatta’s presidency were briefly but broadly attended by national po-
litical goodwill, but this spirit waned following the regime’s alienation 
of potential adversaries” (ibid., p. 80). The fallout between Kenyatta 
and his former vice president Jaramogi Oginga, a Luo, led Kenyatta to 
create “a coercive state, where opposition was systematically crushed, 
often violently” (ibid.). 
PR’s envisaged roles in the young country, such as keeping the pub-
lic informed on government’s development projects and helping en-
dear the government to the Kenyan people, were jeopardized by the 
stifling of public information. Upon coming to power in 1978, Moi 
deepened control of information. 
Although Moi’s government monitored and distrusted journalists 
and PROs, a few determined private sector PR practitioners continued 
to promote the profession. In 1991, the International Public Relations 
Association (IPRA) held a professional development and educators’ 
conference in Nairobi (Opukah, 1992). Under the theme “The Pace of 
Change — Africa’s Public Relations Challenge,” it attracted practitio-
ners and educators from around the globe. 
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The next section will discuss the status of PR during the govern-
ment of Mwai Kibaki. President Kibaki, a well-known economist and 
anticorruption crusader, was elected in 2002 after beating Moi’s cho-
sen heir, Uhuru Kenyatta. Unlike Moi’s presidency, Kibaki’s tenure as 
president has been hailed as the time when Kenya recorded great so-
cio-economic and political progress. Murithi Mutiga, a columnist with 
Kenya’s Sunday Nation newspaper, observed: “On the economic front, 
he was a considerable success, and the huge middle class which has 
made Kenya one of the main places major multinationals want to set 
up shop on the continent is his legacy” (2014, p. 8). 
Unlike Moi, Kibaki did not muzzle public information and was 
not suspicious of international companies wanting to do business in 
Kenya. During his presidency several international PR firms includ-
ing Hill & Knowlton and Burson-Marsteller opened offices in Nairobi. 
Kibaki’s government also created the position of government spokes-
person and hired Dr. Alfred Mutua, a former communication profes-
sor. Mutua held a media briefing every week and more when a crisis 
that required the public be kept informed. His briefing sessions dem-
onstrated a spokesperson that was free to provide information that 
the media wanted. 
Public information officers in government ministries also were 
free to brief the media. For the first time, the military had three 
spokespersons who kept the public informed of any operations the 
military was carrying out in parts of the country and in Somalia 
where they were sent to combat al Shabab, the al-Qaeda linked ter-
rorist group. Kibaki’s government increased the use of external PR 
services to publicize government projects, notably national health 
care campaigns. During the constitutional referendum of 2005, the 
government had PR-led campaigns on important aspects of the new 
constitution. For political campaigns, Kibaki and his successor Uh-
uru Kenyatta separately hired PR advisers to manage the message 
strategy for their campaigns. 
Alfred Ng’ang’a argues that PR’s growth in Kenya is tied to the poli-
tics of the day: “Local PR practice has particularly evolved with the re-
spective political transitions. These transitions have also tended to en-
courage economic growth which in turn fires demand for PR services” 
(Ng’ang’a, personal communication, 2 June 2014). Ng’ang’a credits the 
Kibaki administration for liberalizing Kenya’s politics and the economy 
which in turn led to a thriving PR practice: “Before the 2002 Mwai 
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Kibaki electoral win PR services, now aptly named Public Informa-
tion Services, within government were virtually nonexistent” (ibid.). 
Following the liberalization of the economy by Kibaki’s govern-
ment, some industries such as telecommunications, especially mobile 
phones, grew rapidly. Ng’ang’a, an account manager at Gina Din Cor-
porate Communications and in charge of the Safaricom telecoms ac-
count, noted that “the entry of telecommunication firms in the early 
2000 provided a previously unseen platform to harness PR services. 
From such humble beginnings, the demand for PR services has signif-
icantly grown both in the public and private sector” (ibid.). 
Professionalization and education 
The Public Relations Society of Kenya (PRSK) was launched in 1971, 
and its membership has grown steadily. Like other national PR orga-
nizations, it has a secretariat and an executive committee elected by 
its members. It also established a code of conduct, which it regulates 
(PRSK, 2014). Another indication of PR continued growth is the in-
crease in the number of colleges and universities offering degrees in 
PR. There are at least ten private and public colleges, and universities 
that offer majors in the subject. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sketched the status of PR from the pre-indepen-
dence Kenya to the first decade of the 21st century. PR’s evolution, it 
has been demonstrated, is closely tied to major national events and 
to social, cultural, political and economic forces. The struggle for in-
dependence provided an opportunity for the use of PR services by the 
white colonialists. The use of PR strategies and tactics to build bet-
ter relationships between the colonialists and the local people, endear 
local people to the colonial government, engage with public opinion 
and improve race relations between the whites and other commu-
nities is a near complete match for the social and political roles of 
PR in modern-day Kenya. There appears to be a continuum of the 
roles of PR from preindependent times to the present time. Jomo Ke-
nyatta’s government of 1962 inherited PR practices from the colonial 
Dane  Kiambi  in  Middle  Eastern and  Afr ican  Perspect ives  … (2014)        14
administration. Kenyatta’s new administration initially followed the 
colonialists’ model: relying on PR to endear Kenyans to it and see the 
government as theirs, assess public opinion and advise the govern-
ment officials accordingly and publicize Kenya abroad. 
Jomo Kenyatta’s desire to consolidate power by silencing political 
dissent through intimidation, detention and assault was, however, 
the harbinger that led his government to abandon well-intentioned 
PR roles. Although there was a slump in the practice of governmental 
PR during the Moi government’s 22 years in power, there were strat-
egies and tactics used which were borrowed from the Kenyatta ad-
ministration. Kenyatta and Moi, for example, used their visits across 
the country to show their closeness to the common person. However, 
Moi’s omnipresence in the state media and tours across the country 
led to his regime becoming unpopular among a sizeable population 
of Kenyans. The cold reception that Moi received in many parts of the 
country showed that the public could differentiate between his pub-
licity stunts and proactive PR strategies and tactics. 
The practice of spending weekends in rural areas, using state me-
dia to endlessly broadcast the president’s itinerary, and stifling public 
information for more politically correct material ended in 2002 when 
Mwai Kibaki took over. Instead, Kibaki focused on rebuilding institu-
tions that had been run down by the Moi regime while also initiat-
ing new projects. Although he rarely traveled upcountry or appeared 
on state-run media, Kibaki left power with higher popularity and en-
dorsement of his work by Kenyans. From this analysis, it is apparent 
that the roles of PR, as understood by the pre-independence colonial 
government, have continued in its practice, by the early Kenyatta and 
later Kibaki governments. 
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